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DEBTORS' ESTATES
RECEIVERSHIP-JURISDICTION UNDER SECTION 57 OF THE
JUDICIAL CODE-COUNTERCLAIM-ABRIDGEMENT
OF BOOTH V. CLARK
Insurance Commissioner for the State of Iowa, as an Iowa re-
ceiver, asked the Federal District Court to take jurisdiction under
diversity of citizenship' and Section 57 of the Judicial Code 2 to
settle claims to a res. Section 57 provides for service by publication
on non-residents to enforce a legal or equitable lien on or claim to
,personal property within the District where the suit is brought. The
suit was begun pursuant to authority and direction of the Iowa
state court.
The Iowa insurance company which had become insolvent agreed
that a Michigan insurance company should reinsure the policy-
holders of the Iowa company. Now the Michigan company is in" re-
ceivership. Securities had been deposited in Iowa according to law
and contract, but the Michigan receiver was collecting the maturing
principal and income on the securities and wishes to have complete
control of them.
The Michigan receiver appeared specially and objected to the
jurisdiction and was overruled. He then filed an answer and coun-
terclaim. Thereupon, the Iowa receiver amended and asked the
Michigan receiver to account for collections ana to be enjoined
from interfering with the Iowa administration. Held: the Federal
District Court in Iowa had jurisdiction to resolve the controversy
under Section 57 of the Judicial Code. Fischer, Commissioner of In-
surance for Iowa, v. American United Life Insurance Co., et al.,
314 U. S. 549, 86 L. ed. 328, 62 Sup. Ct. 380 (1942).
On th strength of Lion Bonding Co. v. Karata 3 the Appellate
Court held that the trial court had no jurisdiction-to determine the
interest of the Michigan receiver in the securities.4 The Supreme
Court evaded this difficulty by distinguishing between interference
with administering a res and determining rights in one. The present
controversy did not "necessarily involve a disturbance of the pos-
'JUDICIAL CODE 24; 28 U. S. C. 41; 28 U. S. C. A. 41.
228 U. S. C. 118, 28 U. S. C. A. 148.
3262 U. S. 77, 67 L. ed. 832, 43 S. Ct. 518 (1922).
4 American United Life Ins. Co. et al. v. Fischer, 117 F. (2d) 811 (1941).
336
NOTES AND COMMENTS 337
session or control of the Michigan . . . (court) over the property
in (its) possession." 5 Further, as the Iowa state receiver sought
the jurisdiction of the federal court, the prohibition of Penna. v.
IVillian'; -was not in point.
As the principal case 7 recognizes the right of a foreign equity
receiver to appear and answer regardless of whether or not he is a
statutory successor I or quasi assignee,9 it further strengthens a limi-
tation to Booth v. Clark 10 which forbade an equity receiver to sue in
a foreign federal court. In view of the fact that action under Section
57 of the Judicial Code is to quiet title and that unless such a receiver
may appear and assert his claims he is in effect excluded, the limi-
tation is highly desirable.
While it upheld the trial court's jurisdictional power to de-
termine all rights to principal and interest in the securities held by
the Iowa receiver, the decision falls far short 1 of deciding to what
extent an adjudication of rights in securities under Section 57 may
affect the administration of collections on such securities then in
possession of a foreign court. 2
JB. S.
1314 U. S. at 554.
0294 U. S. 176, 79 L. ed. 841, 55 S. Ct. 380 (1934), which forbade assumption of
federal jurisdiction in receiverships when there is special state machinery for administer-
ing the assets of particular businesses. See also: Gordon v. Ominsky, 294 U. S. 186,
79 L. ed. 848, 55 S. Ct. 391 (1934); Penna. General Casualty Co. v. Penna., 294 U. S.
11,9, 79 L. ed. 850, Z5 S. Ct. 3.6 (1934); (1931) 1 0. S. L. J. 322.
314 U. S. at 553, citing Clark v. Williard, 294 U. S. 211, 86 L. ed. 330, 62 S. Ct. 382
(1935).
1Refle v. Rundle, 103 U. S. 222, 26 L. ed. 337 (1881); American National Bank v.
National Benefit & Casualty Co., 70 Fed. 420 (1895).
'Conserve v. Hamilton, 224 U. S. 243, 56 L. ed. 749, 32 S. Ct. 415, (1911); Bern-
hoimer v. Converse, 20 U. S. 516. 51 L. ed. 1163, 27 S. Ct. 775 (1907); (1931) 1 0. S. L. J.
QA!; First, Extraterritorial Powers of Receivers, (1932) 27 ILL. L. REv. 482; Laughlin,
The Extraterritorial Powers of Receivers, (1932) 45 HAR. L. Rav. 704; Rose, Extra
territorial Actions by Reccvers, (133) 17 Mrsi. L. REv. 237.
x 17 How. Rep. (U. S.) 322, 15 L. ed. 164 (1854).
",Whether the scope of the decree entered by the District Court was proper we do
not decide. We only hold that the District Court had jurisdiction to resolve the contro-
versy under see. 57 of the judicial Code. The Circuit Court of Appeals should have
decided what rights, under Iowa law, Iowa and its receiver had to the securities and
collections thereon, and whether the decree entered by the District Court was kept within
the appropriate limits." 314 U. S. 555.
12Annotation, 96 A. L. R. pp. 485.40.
